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1 Introduction
The e¢ cient market hypothesis (EMH) suggests that at any given time prices fully reect all available
information on a particular stock market. Thus, according to the (weak form) EMH, no investor can
gain an advantage in predicting the return on a stock using publicly available information. However,
there is a lot of evidence against the EMH in the real world of investment. There is an extensive
literature on anomalies in nancial markets including size e¤ects, stock split e¤ects, and monthly
seasonals, see for example the recent volume of Keim and Ziemba (2000) for a general discussion.
It is well documented that some predictable patterns exist in the day-of-the-week returns. The
phenomenon that the Monday (close Friday to close Monday) stock returns, on average, are less
than returns on any other day of the week and indeed nett returns are negative has been called
the Monday e¤ect (or weekend e¤ect) in the literature. There are other denitions of the Monday
e¤ect, and we will examine a number of di¤erent hypotheses capturing the general spirit of this
phenomenon.
The Monday e¤ect in the US stock market is extensively documented during the 1980s, see
e.g., French (1980), Gibbons and Hess (1981), Rogalski (1984), and Keim and Stambaugh (1984).
On the other hand, some recent papers present evidence that the Monday e¤ect in the US and
UK stock markets has gradually disappeared. For example, Fortune (1998) shows that after 1987
there is no evidence of a negative weekend return. Mehdian and Perry (2001) show that in the
1987-1998 period Monday returns are not signicantly di¤erent from returns during the rest of the
week for the SP500, DJCOMP and NYSE (large-cap) indexes. Coutts and Hayes (1999) also show
empirically that the Monday e¤ect exists but is not as strong as has been previously documented for
the UK stock indexes, see also Steeley (2001). Wang, Li, and Erickson (1997) show that the Monday
e¤ect (negative returns) occurs primarily in the last two weeks of the month for a number of stock
indexes consistently over the period 1962-1993, while returns for the rst part of the month are not
statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero.
What are the explanations for di¤erences in expected returns across days of the week? There are
four types of explanation. First, that this is a statistical artifact obtained by data-snooping. Recently,
Sullivan, Timmerman, and White (2001) made this critique of the calendar e¤ects literature. They
applied a statistical procedure that controls for data-mining in testing for calendar e¤ects. They
found that the Monday e¤ect was much less statistically signicant than in previous studies. Their
results were obtained on the DJIA over the period 1896-1996. Hansen, Lunde, and Nason (2005) have
extended this work. Both these papers compare expected returns or Sharpe ratios. The second class
of explanations involve market microstructure, specically, issues about settlement, dividends, and
taxes. For example, French (1980) proposed the calendar time hypothesis, which would suggest that
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expected returns be actually larger over the weekend (Friday to Monday) because of the three calendar
days in-between versus the usual one calendar day for other days of the week. This hypothesis is at
odds with the data. Lakonishok and Levi (1982) suggest that expected returns should be di¤erent
across days due to the 5-day settlement period, which has the e¤ect of making expected returns higher
on Fridays and lower on Mondays relative to either a trading or calendar time model. The general
consensus appears to be that the data does not support the precise predictions of their hypothesis,
see Pettengill (2003). The third class of explanations involve di¤erent rates of ow of micro and
macro information. Basically, the release of bad news tends to be delayed until the weekend, French
(1980). Steeley (2001) argues that the Monday e¤ect in the UK stock market is related to the
systematic pattern of market wide news arrivals that concentrates between Tuesdays and Thursdays.
However, a number of studies have found that this does not explain the whole e¤ect, see Pettengill
(2003). The fourth class of explanations invokes the di¤erential trading patterns of various market
participants. Individuals are net sellers on Mondays, and individuals behave di¤erently on Mondays
versus other days of the week. Or else, it could also be due to short selling activity -short sellers
close their position on Fridays as it is di¢ cult to monitor over weekends (perhaps most of them go
on holiday). They sell the stocks on Monday leading to a fall in prices. There are some studies that
have documented di¤erent behaviour of individuals on Mondays versus other days. For example,
Pettengill (1993) nds that individuals were much more likely to invest in risky assets when the
experiments were conducted on Fridays than when they were on Mondays.1 There are a wide range
of views on the signicance of this e¤ect in explaining stock market anomalies. Finally, others have
questioned the magnitude of the Monday e¤ect and whether it is su¢ ciently large to generate prots
based on simple trading rules, French (1980).
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the existence of the Monday e¤ect in
major stock markets using the stochastic dominance (hereafter SD) criterion. The above approaches
have all been based on a comparison of expected returns or Sharpe ratios. The validity of these
approaches can be questioned on many grounds. Comparison of expected returns is questionable
because there may always be omitted risk factors that account for the di¤erences in mean returns.
Mean variance analysis can be formally justied on economic grounds only under either normal
returns or quadratic utility. Both of these hypotheses are questionable on logical and empirical
1Interestingly, there appear to be weekende¤ects in a wide range of other social and physical phenomena. Ozone
and other particulate concentrations appear to be higher at weekends than during the week contrary to expectations.
Similarly, diurnal temperature range is known to be di¤erent at the weekend, mostly higher, Forster and Solomon
(2003). Mortality from murder, by SIDS, and in hospital patients is also subject to a weekend e¤ect Wiersema (1996),
Spiers and Guntheroth (2005), and Washington Post (2004). Many of these phenomena have only partial explanations.
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grounds, as is well explained in Levy (2006), see also Post (2003). According to Levy (2006),
the criterion of stochastic dominance is the natural economic criterion to apply to investors who
follow the expected utility paradigm. In this approach, there are a hierarchy of criteria: First
order dominance applies to non-satiable individuals, Second order dominance applies to non-satiable
and risk averse individuals. Third and higher order dominance can be dened for individuals with
additional restrictions on their utility functions. The second order dominance criterion is perhaps
the most central concept for nancial applications as risk aversion seems natural. In our context, if
Monday returns are second order stochastically dominated by the other weekday returns, then no
risk averse individual (who is also a maximizer of expected utility) would prefer Monday returns
to the other weekday returns. In this case, we shall say that the Monday e¤ect exists in the sense
of the second order SD. The traditional notion of the Monday e¤ect is based on comparing mean
returns by dummy regression analysis. However, given the considerable evidence of non-normality
of stock returns, relying purely on expected returns to assess investment strategies may not be
appropriate because those large di¤erence in expected returns may be compensated by di¤erences
in risk. This view was taken by Seyhun (1993) in his exploration of the January e¤ect. He argues
that the SD approach provides a clearer test of the market e¢ ciency hypothesis by taking account
of omitted risk factors. Therefore, we believe that our general notion of the Monday e¤ect based on
the SD criterion is more powerful than the traditional notion. Note that a necessary condition for
rst order and second order stochastic dominance is majorization in mean, but this is not generally
su¢ cient. Even if domination of the mean is found this does not imply that all non-satiable risk
averse investors would prefer not to choose that asset. Seyhun (1993) provides an analysis of rst,
second, and third order stochastic dominance of January returns, and nds that January returns
generally stochastically dominate the returns from other months. However, he did not provide a
statistical basis for interpreting his results other than a small simulation study.
We consider observations on US, UK, and Japanese major stock indexes during the period
1/1/1970 - 12/31/2004. In particular, we consider the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA), the
S&P 500, the NASDAQ, the Russell 2000, the FTSE 100, and the Nikkei 225. We also consider the
CRSP indexes, value and equal weighted, with and without dividend payments over the same period.
This covers both small cap and large cap indexes. The time period covers more recent events than
earlier studies. To test the general notion of the Monday e¤ect, we shall employ modied versions of
the test of Linton, Maasoumi and Whang (2005) (hereafter LMW). This is a consistent test of the
hypothesis according to the usual denitions, and indeed has non trivial power against a large class
of local alternatives.
The main ndings of this paper can be summarized as follows. We nd strong evidence of a
Monday e¤ect under this stronger criterion in some cases. Specically, we nd evidence of the
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second order dominance of Monday by other days for the full sample of DJIA and S&P500. There is
strong evidence of rst order dominance in the CRSP indexes, especially for the equal weighted ones.
There is less evidence of dominance in the subsample from 1988 -2004 for the DJIA and S&P500
as well as the value weighted CSRP indexes. However, there is evidence of second order dominance
in the later period for the NASDAQ and the Nikkei 225. The very small cap Russell 2000 shows
evidence of rst order domination for the later period. We also nd evidence that the e¤ect is even
stronger in the second half of the month and on days when the previous Friday return was negative.
This is consistent with the ndings of Wang, Li, and Erickson (1997) and Mehdian and Perry (2001).
Our defence against the data snooping critique of Sullivan, Timmerman, and White (2001) and
Hansen, Lunde, and Nason (2005) is that we are using a di¤erent economic criterion that is more
acceptable from a theoretical point of view than theirs. We are therefore using a di¤erent statistical
technique quite unrelated to the regression and Sharpe ratio approaches they looked at and that
others have followed. Indeed, our hypothesis is stronger than theirs since it concerns the whole
distribution. Also, we are using a large number of di¤erent indexes, large cap and small cap, domestic
and international, and over a more recent period than they did. So the combination of evidence
seems quite strong. There is also a question as to what is the relevant universe to dene for the
data snooping test, and whether in practice statisticians really are searching over so many obviously
absurd potential anomalies.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 denes the hypotheses of interest and
denes the test statistics. Section 3 presents the empirical results and Section 4 concludes.
2 Monday E¤ect and Stochastic Dominance
The theory of stochastic dominance o¤ers a decision-making rule under uncertainty provided the
decision-makers utility function share certain properties. It was rst established by Hadar and
Russell (1969), Hanoch and Levy (1969), and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). The stochastic dom-
inance rule is more satisfactory from an economic theory point of view than the commonly used
mean-variance rule since it is dened with reference to a much larger class of utility functions/return
distributions.2 We rst briey dene the criteria of stochastic dominance.
2.1 Concepts of Stochastic Dominance
Let X1 and X2 be two random variables (or returns/prospects). Let U1 denote the class of all von
Neumann-Morgenstern type utility functions, u, such that u0  0; (increasing). Also, let U2 denote
2Levy (2006) is an excellent reference for further details on stochastic dominance.
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the class of all utility functions in U1 for which u00  0 (concavity), and let U3 be the set of functions
in U2 for which u000  0. Let F1(x) and F2(x) be the cumulative distribution functions of X1 and X2,
respectively. Then, we dene
Denition 1 X1 First Order Stochastic Dominates X2, denoted X1 FSD X2, if and only if either:
(1) E[u(X1)]  E[u(X2)] for all u 2 U1; with strict inequality for some u; Or
(2) F1(x)  F2(x) for all x with strict inequality for some x.
Denition 2 X1 Second Order Stochastic Dominates X2, denoted X1 SSD X2, if and only if either:
(1) E[u(X1)]  E[u(X2)] for all u 2 U2, with strict inequality for some u; Or
(2)
R x
 1 F1(t)dt 
R x
 1 F2(t)dt for all x with strict inequality for some x:
The third order dominance criteria is dened likewise. Any ordering of outcomes derived from
a specic utility function in U1; U2, and U3 will not enjoy general acceptance. This is a major
reason for adopting the SD criterion. Levy (2006) gives the following simple example. Suppose that
X1 2 f1; 2g with equal probability on each outcome and X2 2 f2; 4g likewise. Then E(X1) < E(X2)
but var(X1) < var(X2) so that there exists a mean/variance optimizer who would prefer X1 over X2:
However, this cannot make economic sense because X1  X2 with probability one.
Let D(1)k (x) = Fk(x) and then recursively dene
D
(s)
k (x) =
Z x
 1
D
(s 1)
k (t)dt; s  2
for each k:We say that X1 Stochastically Dominates X2 at order s, if D
(s)
1 (x)  D(s)2 (x) for all x with
strict inequality for some x, see LMW for a further discussion on the di¤erent concepts of stochastic
dominance. Davidson and Duclos (2000) o¤er a very useful characterization of any SD order and
tests.
In our case we have k = 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 days of the week, and so we need a slight generalization of the
above denition designed for two variables, and we shall adopt the stochastic maximality approach
initiated by McFadden (1989) and Klecan, McFadden, and McFadden (1991).
2.2 The Hypotheses of Interest and Test Statistics
LetX1 denotes the Monday returns andX2; : : : ; X5 denote the other weekday (i.e., Tuesday,..., Friday,
respectively) returns. The hypothesis that is usually tested in the literature is that E(Xj) = E(Xk)
for j; k = 1; : : : ; 5 against the alternative that E(Xj) 6= E(Xk) for some j; k 2 f1; : : : ; 5g: This is
usually performed by a Wald or F test from a regression of daily returns on daily dummies. Another
test that is commonly used is of the hypothesis that E(X1) = 0 against the one-sided alternative
5
that E(X1) < 0; which can be done with a t-test on the Monday coe¢ cient.3 Neither approach really
captures the essence of the Monday e¤ect as either the alternative is too general or the null is too
strong. We think that the hypothesis of a Monday e¤ect the literature has in mind is that
E(X1)  E(Xj); j = 2; : : : ; 5; (1)
i.e., mean returns on Monday are lower than mean returns on other days of the week. Wolak (1987)
develops a statistic suitable for testing this hypothesis against its general alternative in a regression
context. Our purpose is to test the following related hypothesis
H10 : Monday is (stochastically) dominated by all other weekdays, (2)
with alternative the negation of the null. This hypothesis is stronger than (1), i.e., (1) is necessary
but not su¢ cient for (2). Therefore, if (2) is true, then so is (1).
To provide a more nuanced investigation of the Monday e¤ect, we consider the following additional
null hypotheses: H20 :Monday dominates at least one of the other weekdays; H
3
0 :Monday dominates
all other weekdays; H40 :Monday is dominated by at least one of the other weekdays; H
5
0 :There
exists at least one day that dominates all others; H60 :There exists at least one day that is dominated
by all others; H70 :Either Monday or the rest of the weekdays dominates the other. The alternative
hypotheses are negations of the null hypotheses. Note that the Monday e¤ect is compatible with the
null hypotheses H10 ; H
4
0 ; H
6
0 ; and H
7
0 : On the other hand, the reverse Monday e¤ect is compatible
with H20 ; H
3
0 ; H
5
0 ; and H
7
0 : For completeness we also include the (rather strong) hypothesis of equal
distributions, which is consistent with the EMH and therefore inconsistent with either the Monday
or the reversed Monday e¤ects, i.e., H80 : All days have the same distribution of returns. We consider
these di¤erent null hypotheses because they provide additional shades of meaning. Hypothesis H10 is
the main focus, H40 is a weaker form, while H
6
0 and H
7
0 contain ambiguity about which day is special,
likewise with H20 ; H
3
0 ; H
5
0 ; and H
7
0 :
4
We next express the above hypotheses using functionals of the distribution functions of the
returns. Let X denote the support of X 0ks for k = 1; : : : ; 5; and let s = 1; 2; 3 represent the order of
stochastic dominance. For each k; l = 1; : : : ; 5; s = 1; 2; 3; and x 2 X ; let (s)k;l (x) = D(s)k (x) D(s)l (x):
3Kamara (1997) and Mehdian and Perry (2001) also test the hypothesis E(X1) =
P5
j=2E(Xj)=4 versus E(X1) <P5
j=2E(Xj)=4.
4This ambiguity can capture other day of the week e¤ects as have been found in some international markets,
Martikainen and Puttonen (1996).
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Then dene:
d1s = max
k 6=1
sup
x2X

(s)
k;1(x); d

2s = min
k 6=1
sup
x2X

(s)
1;k(x) (3)
d3s = max
k 6=1
sup
x2X

(s)
1;k(x); d

4s = min
k 6=1
sup
x2X

(s)
k;1(x) (4)
d5s = min
k
max
l 6=k
sup
x2X

(s)
k;l (x); d

6s = min
k
max
l 6=k
sup
x2X

(s)
l;k (x) (5)
d7s = min
k

max
k 6=1
sup
x2X

(s)
k;1(x);max
k 6=1
sup
x2X

(s)
1;k(x)

; d8s = max
k 6=1
sup
x2X
(s)1;k(x) (6)
The null and alternative hypotheses in H10-H
8
0 can now be stated as:
Hj0 : d

js  0 vs: Hj1 : djs > 0 for j = 1; : : : ; 8: (7)
We next discuss how to compute test statistics based on a data set fXkt : t = 1; : : : ; N; k =
1; : : : ; 5g: The test statistics we consider are based on the empirical analogues of (3)-(6). For example,
for the null hypothesis H10 ; we dene the test statistic to be
D1
(s)
N = max
k 6=1
sup
x2X
p
N
h
D
(s)
N (x;
Fk)  D(s)N (x; F1)
i
; (8)
where
D
(s)
N (x;
Fk) =
1
N(s  1)!
NX
i=1
1(Xki  x)(x Xki)s 1 for k = 1; : : : ; 5: (9)
The other test statistics D2(s)N ; : : : ; D8
(s)
N are dened analogously. The supremum in (8) can be
approximated by the maximum over a dense grid, see LMW for further discussion.
Rejection of each hypothesis is based on large positive values of the test statistic: Under suitable
regularity conditions as in LMW (Assumptions 1-3), we can show that the test statistics converge
weakly to functionals of a Gaussian process. However, since the limiting distributions depend on
unknown true distributions of X 0ks; the asymptotic critical values cant be tabulated once and for
all. Therefore, as in LMW, we suggest to estimate the asymptotic p-values using resampling schemes
such as bootstrapping and subsampling. See Horowitz (2000) for a discussion of the general issues
involved in resampling time series.
First, we describe the subsampling procedure. Let WN denote any of the test statistics Dj
(s)
N for
j = 1; : : : ; 8, s  1: Then,
(i) Calculate the test statistic WN using the original full sample WN = fZi = (X1i; : : : ; X5i)> :
i = 1; : : : ; Ng:
(ii) Generate subsamples (or blocks) WN;b;i = fZi; : : : ; Zi+b 1g of size b for i = 1; : : : ; N   b+ 1.
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(iii) Compute test statistics WN;b;i using the subsamples WN;b;i for i = 1; : : : ; N   b+ 1:
(iv) Approximate the asymptotic p-value by
pS;b =
1
N   b+ 1
N b+1X
i=1
1(WN;b;i > WN): (10)
The choice of the subsample size can be data-dependent and should satisfy b!1 and b=N ! 0
as N !1; see LMW for details.
On the other hand, the (re-centered overlapping) bootstrap procedure can be described as follows:
(i) Same as Step (i) above.
(ii) Same as Step (ii) above.
(iii) Generate the bootstrap sampleWN = fZi : i = 1; : : : ; Ng by sampling theN b+1 overlapping
blocks and laying them end-to-end in the order sampled. Repeat this M -times, where M is
the number of the bootstrap samples.
(iv) Compute the recentred test statistic W N using the bootstrap sampleWN : For example, for the
test D1(s)N dene
W N =: D1
(s)
N = max
k 6=1
sup
x2X
p
N
h
D
(s)
N (x;
Fk)  D(s)N (x; F1)
i
;
where
D
(s)
N (x;
Fk) =
1
N(s  1)!
NX
i=1

1(Xki  x)(x Xki)s 1   !(i; b; N)1(Xki  x)(x Xki)s 1
	
;
!(i; b; N) =
8>><>>:
i=b
1
(N   i+ 1)=b
if i 2 [1; b  1]
if i 2 [b;N   b+ 1]
if i 2 [N   b+ 2; N ] :
Repeat this M -times.
(v) Approximate the asymptotic p-value by calculating the proportion of W N s that exceeds WN
in the M repetitions.
Instead of this overlapping block bootstrap, we can also use the non-overlapping block bootstrap
of Carlstein (1986) or the stationary bootstrap of Politis and Romano (1994), see Lahiri (1999) for
a recent survey. As in subsampling, the length b of the blocks should satisfy b!1 and b=N ! 0 as
N !1: LMW prove that subsampling provides consistent critical values under very weak conditions
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allowing for cross-sectional dependence amongst the outcomes and weak temporal dependence. LMW
also provide simulation evidence on the small sample performance of their test statistics in a variety
of sampling schemes. They show that the nite sample performance is quite good even for sample
sizes of 500. In our empirical work below we use both the bootstrap and the subsampling algorithms
to compute critical values.
3 Empirical Results
3.1 Data
We use a number of end of the day indexes. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and the S&P
500 cover the period 1/1/1970 to 12/31/2004. The sample period for the NASDAQ and the Russell
2000 is from 1/1/1988 to 12/31/2004. The CRSP indexes, EWX (equal weighted without dividends),
VWX (value weighted without dividends), EWD (equal weighted with dividends), and VWD (value
weighted with dividends) cover exactly the same period. We also examine the Nikkei 225 and the
FTSE 100 during the period 1/1/1990 to 12/31/2004. This extends the period of Steeley (2001) who
analyzed the FTSE 100 over 1/4/1991 - 1/8/1998. To investigate the structural change e¤ect after
the 1987 crash (see Fortune (1998), Median and Perry (2001), and Brusa, Liu and Schulman (2003)),
we analyze the DJIA, S&P 500, and CRSP indexes for two sub-periods, i.e. pre-1988 and post-1988.
We excluded weeks containing holidays in order to accommodate general dependence amongst the
returns in each week. The number of observations are: DJIA, S&P 500, EWX, EWD, VWX, and
VWD (793, pre-1988; 744, post-1988), NASDAQ and Russell 2000 (744), FTSE 100 (677) and Nikkei
225 (613). Daily returns are calculated as: Ri = ln(Pi=Pi 1); where Ri is the daily return on day i,
Pi and Pi 1 are closing values of stock index on days i and i  1 respectively. The CRSP EWD and
VWD data include dividends in the denition of returns, whereas the EWX and VWX exclude them.
Lakonishok and Smidt (1989) included dividend returns in the DJIA and found that for example in
1981 42% of dividend returns occurred on a Monday. However, they later found that adjusting for
dividend returns makes very little di¤erence to the analysis. Steeley (2001) found something similar
in the FTSE. We include both with and without dividend indexes for the CRSP data to check this.
9
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Regression Analysis
To compare our methods with the existing results, we rst consider the traditional method that has
been frequently used in the literature. That is, consider the linear regression
Ri = 1D1i + 2D2i + 3D3i + 4D4i + 5D5i + "i; (11)
where Ri is the stock return, D1i is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if day i is a Monday,
and 0 otherwise, D2i is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if day i is a Tuesday, and 0
otherwise; and so forth.
Table 1.1 provides the OLS estimates for all indexes and subperiods. The standard errors are
Newey-West (1987)s HAC estimates with data dependent truncation. W1 is the Wald test statistic
for the null hypothesis H0 : 1 = 2 = 3 = 4 = 5; and W2 is that for H0 : 1  2; 1 
3; 1  4; 1  5: The alternatives are just the negations. The test of W2 is due to Wolak (1987)
and our use appears new in this literature. The apparent Monday e¤ect based on mean returns
exists in DJIA (1970-1987), S&P 500 (1970-1987), and Russell 2000 (1988-2004), which is consistent
with the literature. Note that the post-1988 DJIA Monday returns are signicantly positive as
was documented elsewhere. However, since W1 is not signicant, this does not support the reverse
Monday e¤ect in this period, contrary to Median and Perry (2001) and Brusa, Liu and Schulman
(2003). Also, unlike the Russell 2000, the Monday e¤ect does not seem to exist on the NASDAQ. The
Nikkei 225 shows that Monday returns are signicantly negative on average but the W1 indicates
that they are not signicantly di¤erent from the other weekday returns. As in Steely (2001), the
Monday e¤ect is not signicant for the FTSE.5 Regarding the CRSP indexes, the equal weighted
series show the stronger evidence of Monday e¤ect for the full sample as well as both subsamples:
in all such cases W1 is rejected but W2 is not rejected. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient on Monday is
always negative. The value weighted CRSP series show less evidence since W1 is not rejected for
1988-2000. The coe¢ cient on Monday in those cases is also positive; however, it is still lower than
the coe¢ cient on all other days of the week.
***Table 1.1 here***
Daily stock return data are known to have quite heavy tails and so the linear regression results
may be suspect.6 Specically, least squares methods do not have bounded inuence and so outliers
or heavy tails can make the estimator inconsistent. Even when the estimator itself is consistent,
5See Steeley (2001, Table 2) for comparison.
6All the data series strongly fail Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Jarque-Bera tests for normality.
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the standard errors require even higher moments to exist, especially in the dependent heterogeneous
environments that we would like to accommodate here, for consistency. This is a particularly salient
issue here as the 1987 crash produced a very large negative return, and on a Monday. Therefore, we
redid the analysis using the quantile regression techniques due to Koenker and Bassett (1978) that
are robust to heavy tailed errors and outliers. In Table 1.2 we report the results of linear quantile
regressions for quantiles q = 0:25; 0:5; 0:75 for the CRSP indexes; in the unpublished appendix, Cho,
Linton and Whang (2006) we give the results for the other indexes: The results at the median are
generally similar to those of the mean regression. Monday generally has the smallest coe¢ cient except
in the 1988-2004 period for the DJIA and SP500 when the reverse phenomenon is observed. This
nding also holds for the q = 0:25 quantile, but is reversed in many cases for the q = 0:75 quantile -
then the Monday coe¢ cient is actually largest for the Nikkei, the FTSE, S&P500 for 1988-2004, and
the DJIA for 1970-2004 and 1988-2004 (this is not true for the CRSP indexes, although the value
weighted series show a high but not highest coe¢ cient in this case). For the equal weighted CRSP
indices the hypothesis of equal coe¢ cients is strongly rejected at all quantiles and for all subperiods.
For the other series the p values are highest for the later subperiod and q = 0:75; and generally the
pattern is similar to that for the least squares estimates. This is supportive of the idea that the
calendar e¤ect is not just a phenomenon about the mean of returns.
***Table 1.2 here***
To continue the theme of the last paragraph we investigated whether volatility is subject to a
calendar e¤ect. In Table 1.3 we report the results of linear regression using the squared residuals from
the basic linear regression (11) as the dependent variable, here we just report the results for the CRSP
indexes, the full results are found in the unpublished appendix, Cho, Linton and Whang (2006). The
coe¢ cient on the Monday dummy is always the highest, sometimes signicantly so, indicating that
the weekend is associated with higher volatility. This may be as expected from the calendar time
hypothesis of French (1980). However, the level of volatility is never three times that of the other
days: for the DJIA 1970-1987 and the CRSP indexes it is twice the level of the other days, whereas
for the NASDAQ there seems to be almost no di¤erence in the level of volatility over the weekend
versus other days (the Wald test of the calendar time hypothesis is rejected for all series). The Wald
tests for equality of variance indicate some statistical signicance to these di¤erences especially for
the CRSP equally weighted indexes. For both the DJIA and the S&P500, the volatility e¤ect seems
to decline in the later period relative to the earlier period.
***Table 1.3 here***
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Many studies have found a January e¤ect and other monthly level di¤erences in stock returns, see
Seyhun (1993) for example. Therefore, it is important to test whether the Monday e¤ect is a¤ected
by controlling for month e¤ects. In the unpublished appendix, Cho, Linton and Whang (2006), we
report results of a regression where we add in monthly dummies to the basic linear specication
(11). The results for the Wald tests of the main hypothesis are almost identical to those in Table
1.1., so that there is evidence of a Monday e¤ect in many cases. Interestingly, apart from the DJIA,
1988-2004 and the CRSP equal weighted indexes, there appears to be little evidence of a monthly
seasonal after controlling for days of the week. The goodness of t of the regression does rise although
not substantially so after accounting for the number of parameters. We also ran a regression where
we add in year dummies as well to the basic linear specication (11). Again the results for the main
Wald test are similar. Apart from the Nikkei (and then only at 0.06), there does not appear to be
evidence of a year e¤ect. The goodness of t is worse after accounting for the number of parameters.
In conclusion, there appears to be evidence for a Monday e¤ect in some of the stock indexes
at least for some of the time, but it is somewhat sensitive to period and the overall e¤ect is more
complex than can be captured in a simple mean regression specication. This is one reason why
we turn to the distributional analysis involved in the SD criteria. The other reason is of course the
economic case we laid out earlier.
3.2.2 The Stochastic Dominance Approach
In the unpublished appendix, Cho, Linton and Whang (2006), we report a full set of results involving
p-values for tests of 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order dominance corresponding to the eight di¤erent hypotheses
for each of the series in the full sample and subsample and cut according to various parts of the month
etc.7 We give results for bootstrap and subsampling implementations. Here, we focus on a subset
of the results and provide a summary of the more detailed work. Specically, in Table 2 we give
the subsampling results.8 As noted by LMW, the choice of the subsample size b is important but
rather di¢ cult. They propose a number of practical criteria for choosing b. In our application, we
report the median of the p-values from 30 di¤erent subsample sizes in the range [N0:3; N0:7]. We
do not have space here to discuss the results for each individual hypothesis: our summary of the
results informally aggregates across these separate results. We nd strong evidence of a Monday
e¤ect under this stronger criterion in most cases. Specically, we nd evidence of the second order
dominance of Monday by other days for the full sample of DJIA and S&P500. The CRSP data
provides even stronger evidence of rst order dominance for the same period for all four indexes.
7Note that the Monday e¤ect is compatible with the null hypotheses H10 ;H
4
0 ;H
6
0 ; and H
7
0 : On the other hand, the
reverse Monday e¤ect is compatible with H20 ;H
3
0 ;H
5
0 ; and H
7
0 : H
8
0 is compatible with neither.
8The results using bootstrapping agree quite closely with those based on subsampling.
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The evidence of dominance in the subsample from 1988 -2004 for the S&P500 and Dow Jones is
much weaker and there is even some evidence of reversal. However, the CRSP data still support the
hypothesis of dominance in the later subsample although the evidence is much weaker especially for
the value weighted series without dividends. During the same period there is evidence of second order
dominance for the NASDAQ and the Nikkei 225. The very small cap Russell 2000 shows evidence of
rst order domination for this later period. Finally, the FTSE (which is over the later period) shows
only weak evidence of dominance at the third order.
***Table 2 here***
The p-values do not give any idea of the economic magnitude of the di¤erences in outcomes. We
show in Figure 1 the empirical c.d.f.s and s.d.f.s (integrated c.d.f.s) of the ve days for the equal
weighted without dividends CRSP data. The Monday c.d.f. lies above the c.d.f.s for the other days
until a very high level of returns is reached, when the Tuesday distribution crosses it. The other
distributions are always well below the Monday distribution. None of the other s.d.f.s cross the
Monday s.d.f. at all. This shows that bad news tends to be much worse on Mondays than on other
days. Furthermore, the magnitude of the di¤erence, measured by the horizontal distance between
the distribution functions, is quite large.
Motivated by work of Wang, Li, and Erickson (1997) and Mehdian and Perry (2001), we report,
in Cho, Linton and Whang (2006), additional results for: the rst three weeks of the month; the
second half of the month; a positive preceding Friday; a negative preceding Friday. We summarize
these results along with those of Table 2 in a table below. We nd evidence that the e¤ect is
even stronger when the previous Friday return was negative. This e¤ect generally persists across
subsamples although the evidence is inconclusive for the Dow Jones and S&P 500 during the later
period on days when the previous Friday return was negative. This is broadly in agreement with
earlier work, for example Mehdian and Perry (2001) who also found strong e¤ects but e¤ects that
did not persist for large cap indexes. We also nd that the e¤ect is very strong in the second half
of the month and that this e¤ect does persist for both large cap and small cap indexes in the later
period. We nd that when returns on Friday were positive the ordering in many cases reverses
(although not for the CRSP series). On the other hand, the rst half of the month continues to
show predominantly that Monday returns are dominated by other days of the week although the
evidence on this is weaker than for the full sample. This is generally consistent with the ndings of
Wang, Li, and Erickson (1997) and Mehdian and Perry (2001). Since we have used more data and a
di¤erent criterion, we nd this compelling conrmation of their ndings. We remark, however, that
these results are statistically harder to support because the implicit sample sizes are less and so small
sample e¤ects may make these results a bit questionable.
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Summary of Tables
stock indexes whole month weeks 1-3 2nd half + Friday - Friday
a. DJIA (pre-1988) FSD SSD FSD FSD rev FSD
b. DJIA (post-1988) FSD rev FSD rev FSD FSD rev inconclusive
c. DJIA (full sample) SSD inconclusive FSD FSD rev SSD
d. S&P 500 (pre-1988) FSD FSD FSD FSD rev FSD
e. S&P 500 (post-1988) inconclusive FSD rev FSD FSD rev inconclusive
f. S&P 500 (full sample) SSD inconclusive FSD FSD rev FSD
g. NASDAQ (1988-2004) SSD inconclusive FSD FSD rev FSD
h. RUSSELL 2000 (1988-2004) FSD inconclusive FSD inconclusive FSD
i. FTSE 100 (1990-2004) TSD FSD rev FSD FSD rev FSD
j. NIKKEI 225 (1990-2004) SSD SSD SSD FSD rev FSD
k. VWD (1970-1987) FSD FSD FSD FSD rev FSD
l. VWD(1988-2004) inconclusive FSD rev FSD FSD rev FSD
m. VWD (1970-2004) FSD inconclusive FSD FSD rev FSD
n. VWX (1970-1987) FSD FSD FSD inconclusive FSD
o.VWX (1988-2004) inconclusive FSD rev FSD FSD rev FSD
p. VWX (1970-2004) FSD inconclusive FSD FSD rev FSD
q. EWD (1970-1987) FSD SSD FSD inconclusive FSD
r. EWD (1988-2004) FSD SSD FSD inconclusive FSD
s. EWD (1970-2004) FSD FSD FSD weak rev FSD
t. EWX (1970-1987) FSD SSD FSD inconclusive FSD
u. EWX (1988-2004) FSD SSD FSD inconclusive FSD
v. EWX (1970-2004) FSD FSD FSD inconclusive FSD
Notes. + (-) Friday means positive (negative) returns on previous Friday. FSD (SSD) [TSD] means First,
(Second), [Third] order dominance of Monday returns. rev abbreviates reverse.
In conclusion, our methodology supports the view that there is a Monday e¤ect in many indexes,
and in some cases quite a strong one. This evidence should be considered quite convincing because
the null hypothesis is very strong and the result is obtained on many di¤erent series. Of course it
is strongest in those indexes that are more broadly based like the CRSP indexes, suggesting that
capitalization plays an important role in the magnitude and persistence of the e¤ect. The fact that
the e¤ect is reversed or weakened for some large cap and international series is also interesting and
needs explanation. Note that our evidence is robust to a small number of large observations unlike
the previously reported regression results.
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4 Concluding Remarks
The results using stochastic dominance criteria conrm earlier ndings of a Monday e¤ect for many
series over the full sample. This e¤ect has weakened for some large cap series like the DJIA and
the S&P500 post 1987, but remains strong for more broadly based indexes. The a¤ect is attenuated
or enhanced by other conditioning variables but still represents a puzzle to advocates of EMH. Our
analysis is based on a more generally acceptable approach to ranking investments than just looking
at the mean as was implicit in the earlier regression approach. The hypothesis we test is stronger
than the usual one and our results suggest that regardless of investorsattitudes to risk, degree of risk
aversion, or seasonal variations in risk premia, Monday returns were too low to be equilibrium returns.
This cannot be attributed to omitted risk factors. However, we caution that the methodology we
have used generally requires quite large sample sizes and so there are grounds for caution regarding
the main ndings in terms of the statistical signicance.
What are the implications for Asset Pricing? As Fama (1991) puts it, market e¢ ciency per se
is not testable. It must be tested jointly with some model of equilibrium, an asset-pricing model.
Therefore, when we nd anomalous evidence on the behaviour of returns, the way it should be split
between market ine¢ ciency or a bad model of market equilibrium is not clear.
The evidence of stochastic dominance of Monday returns by other weekdays could be combined
with behavioral theories from the psychology literature to create new asset-pricing theories that
combine economic equilibrium concepts with psychological concepts to create an improved asset-
pricing model. For instance, the summary table reveals that there is strong evidence of a Monday
e¤ect on days when the previous Friday return was negative. Market e¢ ciency asserts that apparent
overreaction to information is about as frequent as underreaction, a statement that seems to be
refuted by the above evidence. This underreaction of stock prices is consistent with the behavioural
model proposed by Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), to explain how the judgment biases- the
representativeness bias of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and conservatism attributed to Edwards
(1968)- of investors can produce overreaction to some events and underreaction to others. This
model, however, performs poorly in explaining the other anomalies reported in the literature. This
suggests the need for an alternative model that species biases in information processing that cause
the same investors to under-react to some types of events and over-react to others and also explains
the range of observed results better than the simple market e¢ ciency story.
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Table 1-1. OLS Estimates#
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Mon.  Tue.  Wed.  Thu.  Fri.   W1 W2 2R  2R  
a. DJIA   
 
 
 
 
 
         
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) -0.116 
 
0.027 
 
0.073 
 
0.015  0.033  value 9.172 0.000 0.0036 0.0026 
(NO: 793) t-value -2.144 
**
0.801 
 
2.161 
**
0.460  1.079  prob. 0.057 0.876   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) 0.092 
 
0.055 
 
0.032 
 
-0.016  -0.010  value 5.578 5.056 0.0015 0.0005 
(NO: 744) t-value 2.423 
**
1.608 
 
0.893 
 
-0.435  -0.256  prob. 0.233 0.255   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.015 
 
0.041 
 
0.053 
 
-0.000  0.012  value 3.557 0.000 0.0005 0.0001 
(NO: 1537) t-value -0.455 
 
1.685 
*
2.164 
**
-0.005  0.502  prob. 0.469 0.849   
b. S&P 500   
 
 
 
 
 
         
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) -0.133 
 
0.041 
 
0.092 
 
0.020  0.048  value 15.226 0.000 0.0058 0.0048 
(NO: 793) t-value -2.622 
**
1.259 
 
2.848 
**
0.639  1.628  prob. 0.004 0.878   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) 0.046 
 
0.043 
 
0.044 
 
-0.003  0.001  value 1.761 1.071 0.0004 -0.0005 
(NO: 744) t-value 1.250 
 
1.241 
 
1.231 
 
-0.085  0.030  prob. 0.780 0.475   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.046 
 
0.042 
 
0.069 
 
0.009  0.025  value 8.321 0.000 0.0014 0.0009 
(NO: 1573) t-value -1.448 
 
1.774 
*
2.861 
**
0.359  1.059  prob. 0.081 0.624   
c. NASDAQ   
 
 
 
 
 
         
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.072 
 
0.013 
 
0.111 
 
0.068  -0.006  value 7.241 0.000 0.0018 0.0007 
(NO: 744) t-value -1.356 
 
0.263 
 
2.071 
**
1.243  -0.130  prob. 0.124 0.939   
d. Russell 2000   
 
 
 
 
 
         
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.086 
 
0.027 
 
0.082 
 
0.050  0.042  value 12.467 0.000 0.0032 0.0021 
(NO: 744) t-value -2.181 
**
0.809 
 
2.293 
**
1.327  1.207  prob. 0.014 0.877   
e. FTSE 100   
 
 
 
 
 
         
1990 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.005 
 
0.020 
 
-0.035 
 
0.046  0.016  value 2.546 0.277 0.0006 -0.0004 
(NO: 677) t-value -0.121 
 
0.547 
 
-0.984 
 
1.089  0.398  prob. 0.636 0.567   
f. Nikkei 225   
 
 
 
 
 
         
1990 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.142 
 
0.005 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.023  -0.038  value 2.836 0.000 0.0011 -0.0001 
(NO: 613) t-value -2.054 
**
0.105 
 
-0.360 
 
-0.379  -0.656  prob. 0.586 0.784   
g.VWD   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) -0.124 
 
0.033 
 
0.111 
 
0.054 
 
0.091 
 
value 24.701 0.000 0.0081 0.0071 
(NO: 793) t-value -2.755 
**
1.105 
 
3.542 
**
1.794 
*
3.258 
**
prob. 0.000 0.939   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) 0.024 
 
0.047 
 
0.066 
 
0.027 
 
0.026 
 
value 1.007 0.000 0.0003 -0.0008 
(NO: 744) t-value 0.693 
 
1.415 
 
1.928 
*
0.731 
 
0.732 
 
prob. 0.909 0.864   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.052 
 
0.040 
 
0.089 
 
0.041 
 
0.060 
 
value 16.110 0.000 0.0025 0.0020 
(NO: 1537) t-value -1.793 
*
1.792 
*
3.854 
**
1.726 
*
2.674 
**
prob. 0.003 0.590   
h. VWX   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) -0.152 
 
0.017 
 
0.101 
 
0.043 
 
0.075 
 
value 27.872 0.000 0.0093 0.0083 
(NO: 793) t-value -3.384 
**
0.566 
 
3.229 
**
1.433 
 
2.699 
**
prob. 0.000 0.421   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) 0.012 
 
0.040 
 
0.055 
 
0.019 
 
0.019 
 
value 0.979 0.000 0.0003 -0.0008 
(NO: 744) t-value 0.336 
 
1.181 
 
1.618 
 
0.522 
 
0.538 
 
prob. 0.913 0.854   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.073 
 
0.028 
 
0.079 
 
0.032 
 
0.048 
 
value 18.587 0.000 0.0029 0.0024 
(NO: 1573) t-value -2.506 
**
1.251 
 
3.412 
**
1.332 
 
2.160 
**
prob. 0.001 0.578   
i. EWD   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) -0.144 
 
-0.054 
 
0.110 
 
0.106 
 
0.219 
 
value 118.01 0.000 0.0287 0.0277 
(NO: 793) t-value -3.930 
**
-2.050 
**
4.097 
**
4.137 
**
8.896 
**
prob. 0.000 0.304   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.040 
 
0.054 
 
0.126 
 
0.134 
 
0.204 
 
value 63.123 0.000 0.0133 0.0122 
(NO: 744) t-value -1.386 
 
2.234 
**
4.753 
**
4.856 
**
8.012 
**
prob. 0.000 0.734   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.094 
 
-0.002 
 
0.118 
 
0.120 
 
0.212 
 
value 173.33 0.000 0.0206 0.0201 
(NO: 1573) t-value -3.936 
**
-0.101 
 
6.214 
**
6.287 
**
12.023 
**
prob. 0.000 0.302   
j. EWX   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) -0.164 
 
-0.064 
 
0.105 
 
0.101 
 
0.210 
 
value 123.22 0.000 0.0304 0.0294 
(NO: 793) t-value -4.465 
**
-2.425 
**
3.890 
**
3.916 
**
8.530 
**
prob. 0.000 0.878   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.048 
 
0.049 
 
0.117 
 
0.129 
 
0.199 
 
value 64.306 0.000 0.0136 0.0125 
(NO: 744) t-value -1.677 
*
2.017 
**
4.424 
**
4.661 
**
7.800 
**
prob. 0.000 0.734   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) -0.108 
 
-0.010 
 
0.111 
 
0.114 
 
0.205 
 
value 180.08 0.000 0.0215 0.0210 
(NO: 1573) t-value -4.529 
**
-0.519 
 
5.840 
**
5.996 
**
11.610 
**
prob. 0.000 0.287   
                                            
# The t-values of the table are corrected using Newey-West’s (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
covariance matrix. W1 is the Wald (chi-square) statistic for the null hypothesis Ho: α₁=α2  =α₃=α₄=α5. W2 is the 
Wald test for the null hypothesis Ho: α₁≤ α2 and α₁≤ α₃and α₁≤ α₄and α₁≤ α5 (Wolak, 1987). NO is the number 
of observations per weekday. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 1-2.  Linear Quantile Regression Estimates#
 
 
(unit: %) 
  q Mon. Tue. Wed. Thu. Fri. W p 
a.VWD 0.25 -0.625** (0.045) -0.478** (0.040) -0.394** (0.041) -0.366** (0.035) -0.379** (0.035) 26.35 0.000 
 0.5 -0.075** (0.034) 0.031    (0.034) 0.129** (0.030) 0.042   (0.027) 0.055*   (0.030) 20.88 0.000 
 
1970- 
1987 
0.75 0.431** (0.039) 0.527** (0.036) 0.539** (0.034) 0.465** (0.035) 0.529** (0.035) 6.71 0.152 
 0.25 -0.387** (0.042) -0.417** (0.041) -0.383** (0.042) -0.441** (0.045) -0.427** (0.045) 1.36 0.850 
 0.5 0.094** (0.031) 0.051*   (0.030) 0.106** (0.029) 0.036    (0.031) 0.088** (0.032) 3.89 0.421 
 
1988- 
2004 
0.75 0.535** (0.038) 0.520** (0.041) 0.511** (0.036) 0.539** (0.043) 0.517** (0.037) 0.38 0.984 
 0.25 -0.495** (0.032) -0.453** (0.030) -0.384** (0.029) -0.391** (0.027) -0.390** (0.027) 10.72 0.030 
 0.5 0.011    (0.023) 0.044** (0.022) 0.116** (0.021) 0.039*   (0.020) 0.075** (0.022) 13.92 0.008 
 
1970- 
2004 
0.75 0.490** (0.028) 0.526** (0.027) 0.534** (0.025) 0.495** (0.027) 0.527** (0.026) 2.32 0.678 
b.VWX 0.25 -0.651** (0.045) -0.502** (0.040) -0.403** (0.041) -0.383** (0.035) -0.387** (0.034) 29.93 0.000 
 0.5 -0.093** (0.034) 0.020    (0.034) 0.119** (0.030) 0.034    (0.027) 0.043    (0.030) 22.69 0.000 
 
1970- 
1987 
0.75 0.394** (0.038) 0.503** (0.035) 0.533** (0.034) 0.452** (0.035) 0.513** (0.035) 9.37 0.052 
 0.25 -0.389** (0.040) -0.430** (0.041) -0.397** (0.043) -0.445** (0.045) -0.433** (0.044) 1.33 0.857 
 0.5 0.080** (0.031) 0.043    (0.030) 0.091** (0.029) 0.026    (0.031) 0.084** (0.032) 3.51 0.477 
 
1988- 
2004 
0.75 0.524** (0.038) 0.513** (0.041) 0.499** (0.036) 0.530** (0.043) 0.511** (0.037) 0.39 0.983 
 0.25 -0.518** (0.032) -0.465** (0.029) -0.397** (0.029) -0.404** (0.028) -0.398** (0.027) 12.66 0.013 
 0.5 -0.014    (0.023) 0.031    (0.022) 0.106** (0.021) 0.030    (0.020) 0.065** (0.022) 17.06 0.002 
 
1970- 
2004 
0.75 0.468** (0.028) 0.511** (0.027) 0.526** (0.025) 0.482** (0.027) 0.513** (0.025) 3.28 0.513 
c.EWD 0.25 -0.483** (0.036) -0.380** (0.029) -0.219** (0.030) -0.174** (0.028) -0.082** (0.027) 109.2 0.000 
 0.5 -0.073** (0.025) -0.020    (0.026) 0.125** (0.023) 0.158** (0.022) 0.254** (0.022) 124.5 0.000 
 
1970- 
1987 
0.75 0.295** (0.030) 0.351** (0.026) 0.451** (0.025) 0.459** (0.023) 0.555** (0.024) 59.97 0.000 
 0.25 -0.345** (0.033) -0.225** (0.028) -0.148** (0.032) -0.157** (0.031) -0.070** (0.029) 42.92 0.000 
 0.5 0.026    (0.025) 0.088** (0.022) 0.183** (0.022) 0.181** (0.023) 0.264** (0.021) 65.24 0.000 
 
1988- 
2004 
0.75 0.383** (0.027) 0.390** (0.025) 0.494** (0.025) 0.490** (0.023) 0.529** (0.022) 29.12 0.000 
 0.25 -0.413** (0.025) -0.309** (0.021) -0.194** (0.022) -0.166** (0.021) -0.080** (0.020) 136.2 0.000 
 0.5 -0.029    (0.018) 0.042** (0.017) 0.156** (0.016) 0.168** (0.016) 0.258** (0.015) 187.8 0.000 
 
1970- 
2004 
0.75 0.333** (0.020) 0.366** (0.017) 0.480** (0.018) 0.476** (0.016) 0.542** (0.016) 94.99 0.000 
d.EWX 0.25 -0.503** (0.036) -0.387** (0.029) -0.222** (0.029) -0.182** (0.028) -0.092** (0.027) 112.4 0.000 
 0.5 -0.098** (0.025) -0.024    (0.025) 0.120** (0.023) 0.155** (0.022) 0.248** (0.022) 136.2 0.000 
 
1970- 
1987 
0.75 0.279** (0.030) 0.343** (0.026) 0.446** (0.025) 0.453** (0.023) 0.550** (0.024) 63.92 0.000 
 0.25 -0.349** (0.033) -0.235** (0.028) -0.159** (0.032) -0.161** (0.030) -0.074** (0.029) 43.93 0.000 
 0.5 0.014    (0.025) 0.085** (0.022) 0.178** (0.022) 0.176** (0.023) 0.261** (0.021) 68.53 0.000 
 
1988- 
2004 
0.75 0.372** (0.027) 0.386** (0.025) 0.486** (0.025) 0.486** (0.023) 0.525** (0.022) 30.13 0.000 
 0.25 -0.428** (0.025) -0.318** (0.021) -0.200** (0.022) -0.171** (0.021) -0.084** (0.020) 145.2 0.000 
 0.5 -0.039** (0.018) 0.034** (0.017) 0.151** (0.016) 0.163** (0.016) 0.256** (0.015) 198.9 0.000 
 
1970- 
2004 
0.75 0.321** (0.020) 0.357** (0.017) 0.469** (0.018) 0.470** (0.016) 0.539** (0.016) 100.8 0.000 
                                            
# Standard errors are in parentheses. They are obtained through kernel density estimation. We select (sample size)^(-0.1) for 
the band width. W is the Wald (chi-square) statistic for the null hypothesis Ho: α₁=α2  =α₃=α₄=α5, and p is p-value of W. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level.  
Table 1-3. OLS Estimates# (Dependent variable: 2ε ) 
 
 
  Mon.  Tue.  Wed.  Thu.  Fri.   W Wc 2R  2R  
a.VWD                 
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) 1.339  0.702  0.830  0.701  0.644  value 6.264 16.802 0.0025 0.0015 
(NO: 793) t-value 3.218 ** 14.206 ** 7.225 ** 10.547 ** 11.782 ** prob. 0.180 0.002   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) 1.063  0.876  0.830  0.939  1.009  value 5.757 97.080 0.0012 0.0002 
(NO: 744) t-value 8.616 ** 11.159 ** 11.449 ** 11.547 ** 9.686 ** prob. 0.218 0.000   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) 1.211  0.786  0.830  0.816  0.822  value 4.137 55.124 0.0016 0.0010 
(NO: 1537) t-value 5.338 ** 16.665 ** 11.864 ** 15.160 ** 13.739 ** prob. 0.388 0.000   
b. VWX                 
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) 1.341  0.702  0.828  0.700  0.642  value 6.407 16.813 0.0026 0.0015 
(NO: 793) t-value 3.229 ** 14.202 ** 7.214 ** 10.555 ** 11.758 ** prob. 0.171 0.002   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) 1.062  0.876  0.830  0.939  1.010  value 5.800 97.206 0.0012 0.0002 
(NO: 744) t-value 8.616 ** 11.152 ** 11.438 ** 11.547 ** 9.705  ** prob. 0.215 0.000   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) 1.213  0.786  0.829  0.816  0.821  value 4.209 54.954 0.0016 0.0011 
(NO: 1573) t-value 5.351 ** 16.657 ** 11.850 ** 15.164 ** 13.745 ** prob. 0.379 0.000   
c. EWD                 
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) 0.855  0.485  0.578  0.479  0.451  value 9.725 34.740 0.0029 0.0019 
(NO: 793) t-value 4.529 ** 5.696 ** 5.722 ** 7.545 ** 7.733 ** prob. 0.045 0.000   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) 0.641  0.427  0.477  0.500  0.492  value 8.330 58.679 0.0022 0.0012 
(NO: 744) t-value 8.342 ** 10.281 ** 11.151 ** 8.871 ** 7.104 ** prob. 0.080 0.000   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) 0.754  0.460  0.529  0.490  0.471  value 16.542 82.977 0.0024 0.0018 
(NO: 1573) t-value 7.075 ** 9.333 ** 9.300 ** 11.231 ** 10.266 ** prob. 0.002 0.000   
d. EWX                 
1970 - 1987 Mean (%) 0.855  0.485  0.578  0.479  0.450  value 9.724 34.700 0.0029 0.0019 
(NO: 793) t-value 4.535 ** 5.707 ** 5.720 ** 7.541 ** 7.718 ** prob. 0.045 0.000   
1988 - 2004 Mean (%) 0.641  0.427  0.477  0.500  0.492  value 8.329 58.649 0.0022 0.0012 
(NO: 744) t-value 8.342 ** 10.285 ** 11.142 ** 8.873 ** 7.112 ** prob. 0.080 0.000   
1970 - 2004 Mean (%) 0.755  0.460  0.529  0.490  0.470  value 16.527 82.829 0.0024 0.0019 
(NO: 1573) t-value 7.084 ** 9.347 ** 9.300 ** 11.230 ** 10.264 ** prob. 0.002 0.000   
                                            
# The t-values of the table are corrected using Newey-West’s (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
covariance matrix. W is the Wald (chi-square) statistic for the null hypothesis Ho: α₁=α2  =α₃=α₄=α5. Wc is the Wald 
statistic for the null hypothesis Ho: α₁=3α2  =3α₃=3α₄=3α5. NO is the number of observations per weekday. VWD is the 
value-weighted CRSP index including dividends. VWX is the value-weighted CRSP index excluding dividends. EWD is the 
value-weighted CRSP index including dividends. EWX is the value-weighted CRSP index excluding dividends. 
* Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
Table 2. Median of P-Values*
(Subsampling, subsample range: 7030 .. N~N , number of p-values = 30) 
 
 
 
 
 Period Order I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
a. DJIA 1970 1st 0.4574 0.0026 0.0032 0.4541 0.0978 0.1289 0.2800 0.0032 
 -1987 2nd 0.8185 0.0048 0.0104 0.5630 0.0937 0.7262 0.8185 0.0104 
  3rd 0.7211 0.0107 0.0107 0.5235 0.0483 0.5558 0.7211 0.0107 
 1988 1st 0.1556 0.8008 0.7105 0.0036 0.4273 0.1971 0.6570 0.1556 
 -2004 2nd 0.1478 0.5061 0.4435 0.1241 0.0000 0.1919 0.1885 0.1610 
  3rd 0.0498 0.4283 0.4069 0.2224 0.0530 0.4284 0.1693 0.1078 
 1970 1st 0.2570 0.1947 0.3137 0.2848 0.1626 0.1279 0.0108 0.5008 
 -2004 2nd 0.8361 0.0976 0.0981 0.6003 0.7347 0.7001 0.8361 0.1773 
  3rd 0.7578 0.0559 0.0559 0.5632 0.6333 0.5402 0.7578 0.0559 
b. S&P 500 1970 1st 0.4178 0.0329 0.0000 0.8650 0.8660 0.1587 0.2608 0.0000 
 -1987 2nd 0.7125 0.0027 0.0081 0.5035 0.1128 0.6519 0.7125 0.0081 
  3rd 0.6178 0.0107 0.0107 0.4848 0.1703 0.4986 0.6178 0.0107 
 1988 1st 0.2944 0.6223 0.8446 0.0733 0.4904 0.4420 0.8023 0.3126 
 -2004 2nd 0.4102 0.5202 0.5641 0.2723 0.4580 0.2598 0.2921 0.6383 
  3rd 0.1614 0.4356 0.4345 0.6878 0.7563 0.4656 0.1470 0.3990 
 1970 1st 0.4735 0.1437 0.0873 0.5118 0.6428 0.0329 0.1737 0.1696 
 -2004 2nd 0.7272 0.0383 0.0413 0.5432 0.8844 0.6342 0.7272 0.0415 
  3rd 0.6782 0.0559 0.0559 0.5310 0.8291 0.4881 0.6782 0.0559 
c. NASDAQ 1988 1st 0.2647 0.0884 0.0587 0.8937 0.3181 0.0027 0.1066 0.0587 
 -2004 2nd 0.8535 0.0034 0.0788 0.3709 0.0888 0.7439 0.8488 0.0788 
  3rd 0.7275 0.0000 0.0370 0.3695 0.0262 0.4768 0.7051 0.0370 
d. Russell 2000 1988 1st 0.9596 0.0852 0.0545 0.3984 0.4884 0.8920 0.9588 0.0545 
 -2004 2nd 0.8560 0.0000 0.0201 0.4832 0.2934 0.8102 0.8560 0.0201 
  3rd 0.6889 0.0000 0.0056 0.4750 0.0707 0.5556 0.6797 0.0056 
e. FTSE 100 1990 1st 0.5413 0.0159 0.3944 0.2527 0.2494 0.0068 0.1747 0.7713 
 -2004 2nd 0.5340 0.0293 0.3516 0.6388 0.0941 0.0198 0.3086 0.6133 
  3rd 0.8225 0.0609 0.1430 0.6244 0.0270 0.6714 0.8225 0.2797 
f. Nikkei 225 1990 1st 0.2943 0.0000 0.1613 0.0964 0.0025 0.0000 0.0331 0.2182 
 -2004 2nd 0.7599 0.0101 0.0986 0.6397 0.8776 0.6984 0.7599 0.1046 
  3rd 0.6935 0.0000 0.0389 0.6052 0.7837 0.5519 0.6935 0.0389 
g.VWD 1970 1st 0.7947 0.0508 0.0000 0.9554 0.3001 0.7481 0.7940 0.0000 
 -1987 2nd 0.6763 0.0000 0.0000 0.5007 0.0285 0.6274 0.6763 0.0000 
  3rd 0.5929 0.0096 0.0094 0.4761 0.0100 0.4960 0.5929 0.0094 
 1988 1st 0.5186 0.3525 0.7921 0.4001 0.4279 0.6181 0.6449 0.7459 
 -2004 2nd 0.8116 0.4148 0.4913 0.4580 0.8286 0.4917 0.7280 0.6410 
  3rd 0.8633 0.3119 0.1806 0.4488 0.7678 0.5569 0.8621 0.2722 
 1970 1st 0.7990 0.0981 0.0151 0.5195 0.2088 0.5803 0.7594 0.0151 
 -2004 2nd 0.7365 0.0004 0.0010 0.5559 0.7799 0.6370 0.7365 0.0010 
  3rd 0.6845 0.0197 0.0303 0.5405 0.7626 0.4968 0.6845 0.0303 
h. VWX 1970 1st 0.7712 0.0273 0.0000 0.9524 0.3462 0.7322 0.7675 0.0000 
 -1987 2nd 0.6424 0.0000 0.0000 0.4540 0.0102 0.6108 0.6424 0.0000 
  3rd 0.5547 0.0094 0.0093 0.4370 0.0106 0.4649 0.5547 0.0093 
 1988 1st 0.4860 0.3756 0.7068 0.4530 0.2918 0.6209 0.4760 0.7212 
 -2004 2nd 0.8980 0.3975 0.5007 0.4522 0.7825 0.7366 0.8943 0.6316 
  3rd 0.8627 0.1729 0.1668 0.4488 0.7592 0.5547 0.8604 0.2493 
 1970 1st 0.8042 0.0920 0.0069 0.4558 0.3327 0.6143 0.7711 0.0069 
 -2004 2nd 0.7237 0.0000 0.0000 0.5406 0.7834 0.6312 0.7237 0.0000 
  3rd 0.6609 0.0139 0.0222 0.5210 0.7554 0.4851 0.6609 0.0222 
i. EWD 1970 1st 0.4567 0.1003 0.0000 0.4859 0.9846 0.3331 0.4567 0.0000 
 -1987 2nd 0.7109 0.0000 0.0000 0.5675 0.8780 0.7056 0.7109 0.0000 
  3rd 0.6520 0.0000 0.0000 0.5675 0.7642 0.6371 0.6520 0.0000 
 1988 1st 0.6195 0.0158 0.0000 0.4298 0.5004 0.3795 0.6186 0.0000 
 -2004 2nd 0.6024 0.0000 0.0000 0.2547 0.1165 0.5334 0.6024 0.0000 
  3rd 0.4431 0.0000 0.0000 0.2044 0.0041 0.3755 0.4431 0.0000 
 1970 1st 0.3693 0.0027 0.0000 0.5697 0.9993 0.2181 0.3626 0.0000 
 -2004 2nd 0.5969 0.0000 0.0000 0.4812 0.4717 0.5831 0.5969 0.0000 
  3rd 0.5328 0.0000 0.0000 0.4812 0.1447 0.4840 0.5328 0.0000 
j. EWX 1970 1st 0.3885 0.0701 0.0000 0.4773 0.9805 0.2608 0.3791 0.0000 
 -1987 2nd 0.6977 0.0000 0.0000 0.5675 0.7714 0.6909 0.6977 0.0000 
  3rd 0.6493 0.0000 0.0000 0.5675 0.7532 0.6378 0.6493 0.0000 
 1988 1st 0.6042 0.0237 0.0000 0.4234 0.4925 0.3701 0.6042 0.0000 
 -2004 2nd 0.6031 0.0000 0.0000 0.2547 0.1039 0.5421 0.6031 0.0000 
  3rd 0.4452 0.0000 0.0000 0.2044 0.0041 0.3786 0.4452 0.0000 
 1970 1st 0.3192 0.0031 0.0000 0.5636 0.9993 0.1566 0.3116 0.0000 
 -2004 2nd 0.5931 0.0000 0.0000 0.4812 0.4631 0.5776 0.5931 0.0000 
  3rd 0.5314 0.0000 0.0000 0.4812 0.1468 0.4845 0.5314 0.0000 
 
                                            
*Null hypotheses are as follows. I : All other weekdays s-th order SD Monday, II : Monday s-th order SDs at least one weekday, III : 
Monday s-th order SDs all other weekdays, IV : At least one weekday s-th order SDs Monday, V : At least one weekday s-th order 
                                                                                                                                  
SDs all others, VI : At least one weekday is s-th order SDed by all others, VII : Either rest of weekdays or Monday s-th order SDs the 
other, VIII : The distributions are all identical. 
Figure 1.  (EWX, 1970 - 2004 )
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